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INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were a
2
multitude of ways for borrowers to secure cheap mortgages. Many
borrowers and lenders took advantage of this situation and hastily
executed mortgages which, in hindsight, were not in the best
3
interests of either party. One of those mortgages made its way to
the Minnesota Supreme Court, which proved unwilling to remedy
4
the poorly researched decisions of mortgage lenders.
5
In the recent decision Business Bank v. Hanson, the Minnesota
Supreme Court examined the question of whether a mortgage
securing only a portion of a note was invalid for noncompliance
6
with Minnesota’s Mortgage Registry Tax statute. A subsequent
lender holding a mortgage securing a note in excess of $1.08
million invoked the statute to argue that the prior mortgage was
7
invalid. The court focused on the plain language of the prior
mortgage and held that because the mortgage explicitly stated the
amount of debt it was intended to secure, the owner of the prior
8
mortgage had priority over the subsequent lender. By forcing the
later lender to bear the consequences of improperly conducting a
title search and granting a mortgage to a risky borrower, the
Minnesota Supreme Court reinforced the proposition that
companies who negligently or carelessly assess applicants do so at
9
their own peril.

2. See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis
of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 549, 562–63 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of
Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1317 n.10 (2009) (noting availability of
subprime mortgages to all types of borrowers).
3. See generally Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Law and Economic Issues in Subprime
Litigation, in THE HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 1 (2008), http://
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ferrell_et_al_612.pdf
(exploring explores the economic and legal causes and consequences of recent
difficulties in the subprime mortgage market).
4. See Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 2009).
5. Id.
6. See id. Minnesota’s Mortgage Registration Tax is codified in Minnesota
Statutes §§ 287.01–.39 (2008).
7. Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 287.
8. Id. at 289.
9. See infra notes 185–87
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This case note first discusses the history of Minnesota case law
10
surrounding the Mortgage Registry Tax statute. Next, it discusses
11
the facts and analysis of the Business Bank decision. Last, this case
note concludes that the court not only reached the correct result, it
also prevented unnecessary litigation, dissuaded lenders from
engaging in unsound business practices, and upheld freedom to
12
contract.
II. HISTORY
A. Minnesota Case Law
“A mortgage upon real estate, . . . while in form a conveyance
of an estate or interest in land, in its purpose and effect, is a mere
13
lien or security . . .” on the mortgaged premises. It simply creates
14
a lien enforceable by foreclosure. The lien lasts as long as the
15
debt.
Generally, the validity of a mortgage depends upon whether it
provides “reasonable notice” to third parties of the obligation that
16
it creates. “The execution of mortgages is generally subject [to]
17
statutory regulation.”
Minnesota has recognized for over a hundred years that the
amount owed on a note and the amount secured by a mortgage
18
may be different, and that mortgage security does not extend
19
beyond the definite sum provided in the mortgage instrument.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Parts III, IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. S.R.A., Inc. v. State, 213 Minn. 487, 488, 7 N.W.2d 484, 485 (1943); see also
Ayer v. Stewart, 14 Minn. 97, 98 (1869) (McMillan, J., dissenting).
14. Browning v. Browning, 246 Minn. 327, 334, 76 N.W.2d 100, 105 (1956).
15. Geib v. Reynolds, 35 Minn. 331, 335, 28 N.W. 923, 924 (1886); Folsom v.
Lockwood, 6 Minn. 186, 190 (1861); Whittacre v. Fuller, 5 Minn. 508, 517 (1861)
(“[A] mortgage being given as security for a debt, and not merely for any particular
evidence of debt, the general rule is, that nothing but actual payment of the debt, or
an express release will operate as a discharge of the mortgage. The lien lasts as
long as the debt.”) (emphasis added)).
16. 54A AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 11 (2009); see also Conn. Nat. Bank v.
Esposito, 554 A.2d 735, 738 (Conn. 1989) (“The purpose of such ‘reasonable
notice’ is to prevent parties that are not privy to the transaction from being
defrauded or misled.”).
17. 54A AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 10 (2009).
18. See Winne v. Lahart, 155 Minn. 307, 309–10, 193 N.W. 587, 588–89
(1923); Kingsley v. Anderson, 103 Minn. 510, 511, 115 N.W. 642, 643 (1908).
19. 31 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST MORTGAGES § 1.07 (5th ed. 2009); see Kingsley,
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Minnesota law also provides that a mortgage can secure several
20
notes. When several notes are secured by the same mortgage, it
continues as security for all of them in the absence of an agreement
21
to the contrary.
B. The Mortgage Registry Tax Statute and its Revenue Generating
Purpose
22

Among other statutory provisions, mortgages in Minnesota
23
Originally
are subject to the Mortgage Registry Tax statute.
passed in 1907, the statute was enacted “to provide for the taxation
24
of mortgages of real property.”
Shortly after enactment, disputes began to arise concerning
the validity of mortgages that were not in strict compliance with the
25
statute. In 1913, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the
26
question in First State Bank of Boyd v. Hayden.
In Hayden, the court stated that “[t]he statute is purely a
revenue measure, and we find nothing therein to indicate that it
was the legislative intent to declare instruments void for
27
noncompliance therewith.” Instead of completely invalidating a
103 Minn. at 511, 115 N.W. at 643 (“[A] mortgage securing a note stated to be for
a definite sum, when in fact the note is for a larger sum, is security only for the
smaller sum stated in the mortgage.”).
20. Mut. Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Ecklund Bldg. Co., 180 Minn. 544, 547, 231
N.W. 207, 208 (1930); see Wilson v. Eigenbroht, 30 Minn. 4, 6, 13 N.W. 907, 907
(1882).
21. Mut. Trust Life Ins. Co., 180 Minn. at 547, 231 N.W. at 208; see Hall v. Hall,
31 Minn. 280, 282, 17 N.W. 620, 620 (1883); Wilson, 30 Minn. at 5, 13 N.W. at 907.
22. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 507.24, subdiv. 1 (2008) (detailing the
requirements of a valid mortgage recordation); MINN. STAT. § 507.40 (2008)
(specifying how mortgages are properly discharged).
23. MINN. STAT. §§ 287.01–.39 (2008). The statute provides that the
mortgagor, or borrower in the mortgage agreement, must pay a tax on the
privilege of recording a mortgage. Id. § 287.035.
24. An Act to Provide for the Taxation of Mortgages of Real Property, ch.
328, 1907 Minn. Laws. 448 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 287.01 (2008)); see also
McGovern v. Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul, 209 Minn. 403, 404, 296 N.W. 473, 474
(1941) (“[Minnesota’s] mortgage registry tax is a revenue measure.”).
25. See infra notes 26–35 and accompanying text. The supreme court was also
called to address the constitutionality of the statute shortly after enactment. The
court upheld the constitutionality of the tax, and stated that it must be applied
uniformly to all property belonging to the same tax class. See Mut. Benefit Ins. Co.
v. Cnty. of Marin, 104 Minn. 179, 181–83, 116 N.W. 572, 573–74 (1908).
26. 121 Minn. 45, 140 N.W. 132 (1913).
27. Id. at 47, 140 N.W.2d at 134. The court also explained that “[t]he
contract itself comes into existence through the contractual acts of the parties and
exists as such without reference to the statute . . . .” Id., 140 N.W.2d at 134.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/1

4

Fuchihara: Contracts: A Million Dollar Mistake—Business Bank v. Hanson

302

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

mortgage, the court held that nonpayment of taxes under the
statute created a state of dormancy whereby enforcement of the
mortgage is delayed until performance of the statutory conditions
28
are satisfied.
Later in 1913, the supreme court was again asked to clarify the
effect of the Mortgage Registry Tax statute on the operation of
29
mortgages in Staples v. East St. Paul State Bank.
The security
instrument in Staples was facially deficient, and the creditor asked
30
the district court to reform it so as to cure the deficiency. In
particular, the court discussed and analyzed a provision similar to
the one in force today: “No instrument relating to real estate shall
be valid as security for any debt, unless the fact that it is so intended
31
and the amount of such debt are expressed therein.”
The court held that reformation of a mortgage was permitted,
noting that the statute’s provisions “were not intended to change
the law of contracts, except in so far as it became necessary to
prescribe terms to be incorporated which would furnish
information upon which the proper tax from every transaction
32
could be secured.”
The court determined that, because the
Mortgage Registry Tax statute was a revenue measure, the deed was
33
valid.
The court again reiterated the purpose of the statute in 1922
34
in deciding Engenmoen v. Lutroe. For the third time in less than a
decade, the court explained the legislative intent of the act: “[t]he
act is a revenue measure purely, and the only purpose of its

28. Id., 140 N.W.2d at 134. (“[T]he legislature, having in mind not only
recordable contracts but also unacknowledged and hence unrecordable
instruments, intended to render all contracts within the terms of the act
unenforceable in or by any legal proceeding until the tax has been paid, whether
the instrument is recordable or otherwise.”).
29. 122 Minn. 419, 142 N.W. 721 (1913).
30. Id. at 420–21, 142 N.W.2d at 721.
31. Id. at 421, 142 N.W.2d at 722. At the time the Business Bank decision was
rendered, the statutory language remained virtually unchanged: “No instrument . .
. relating to real estate is valid as security for any debt, unless the fact that it is
intended and the initial known amount of the debt are expressed in it.” MINN.
STAT. § 287.03 (2008).
32. Staples, 122 Minn. at 422, 142 N.W. at 722. The supreme court did not
find it necessary to hold “that where, because of mutual ignorance or mistake, and
without any intention to evade the tax, the contract giving real estate as security
for a debt, fails to comply with the statute, it may not be reformed so as to conform
therewith.” Id.
33. Id., 142 N.W.2d at 722.
34. 153 Minn. 409, 190 N.W. 894 (1922).
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prohibitive provisions is to compel the payment of the prescribed
35
tax.”
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that the
primary function of the Mortgage Registry Tax statute is to
generate revenue. It is not intended to modify existing contract
law, nor should it be invoked as a defense to the formation of an
otherwise effective instrument that reflects the parties’ intent. The
court has consistently rejected attempts to use Minnesota Statutes
section 287.03 as a means to invalidate mortgages. The priority of
interests in real estate is properly determined by the Minnesota
36
Recording Act, not the Mortgage Registry Tax statute. “Nothing
in Chapter 287’s language implies that its provisions are intended
37
as a tool for determining mortgage validity.”
“[P]ractitioners and lenders have long relied on the [supreme
court’s] consistent holding that the Minnesota Mortgage Registry
Tax statute is solely a revenue measure, which cannot be used by a
junior lienholder to subordinate or render unenforceable an
otherwise valid senior lien so long as the required tax has been
38
paid.” They continued to do so during the mortgage boom of the
2000s.
III. THE BUSINESS BANK DECISION
A. Facts
In 2004, Kevin Hanson and Travis Carter formed North
American Pet Distributors, Inc. (NAPD) to purchase an exotic fish
39
wholesaler, U.S. Pet Headquarters, Inc. (U.S. Pet). On February
5, 2004, The Business Bank (Business Bank) loaned NAPD
40
$250,000 on a term note to purchase U.S. Pet’s assets. Hanson
and Carter personally guaranteed the note to be repaid in ninety

35. Id. at 412, 190 N.W.2d at 895–96; see also Mooty v. Union Bond & Mortg.
Co., 180 Minn. 550, 551, 231 N.W. 406, 407 (1930) (explaining that the law
requiring payment of registration tax on mortgage is a revenue measure, and
nonpayment does not make the instrument to which the tax is applicable invalid).
36. See MINN. STAT. § 507.34 (2008); see also Brief for Minn. State Bar Ass’n,
Real Prop. Law Section as Amicus Curiae at 2, Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d
285 (No. A07-1832), 2009 WL 470738 [hereinafter Brief for Minn. State Bar
Ass’n].
37. Brief for Minn. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 36, at 4.
38. Id. at 3.
39. Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 286 (Minn. 2009).
40. Id.
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41

days. They also assumed an existing $111,925.17 debt which U.S.
42
Pet owed Business Bank.
On August 17, 2004, Business Bank loaned NAPD an
additional $50,000 term note and a $100,000 revolving note after
Hanson and Carter were unable to secure additional financing
43
from other sources. Business Bank also extended the term on the
44
initial $250,000 loan.
Business Bank required additional guaranties from Hanson
45
and Carter in exchange for the new loans. Hanson executed an
amended and restated guaranty covering the $400,000 in loans to
NAPD and the $111,925.17 in loans that NAPD assumed in
46
acquiring U.S. Pet. Hanson and Carter both executed $200,000
third party mortgages on their respective houses in favor of
Business Bank; each third party mortgage was recorded in
47
Hennepin County on August 31, 2004.
In September of 2005, Hanson and Carter, still unable to meet
their obligations, negotiated a loan modification agreement with
48
Business Bank. In exchange for an additional $15,000 of debt,
Hanson and Carter were permitted to extend their time for
49
The modification agreement was recorded as an
repayment.
50
amendment to the original mortgages on December 23, 2005.
Apparently unrelated to his business operations, Hanson
51
sought to refinance his home in October 2005. Even though the
title was encumbered by an $880,000 lien in favor of Chase Bank, in
addition to the $200,000 Business Bank lien, Hanson executed a
$1.17 million mortgage on his home in favor of Option One
52
Mortgage Corporation (Option One) on October 31, 2005.
Option One later contended that their title search did not uncover
53
Business Bank’s lien.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 286–87.
47. Id. at 287.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. Hanson did not list his liabilities to Business Bank on his Option One
mortgage application because, according to his belief, his liability to Business Bank
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In 2006, Hanson and Carter defaulted on their obligations to
54
Business Bank after NAPD ceased operations and liquidated.
Business Bank agreed to wait until Hanson satisfied his obligations
before further pursuing Carter, and in exchange, Carter paid half
55
of his debts.
Business Bank filed a complaint seeking, among other claims,
56
to foreclose on the mortgage on Hanson’s home. Business Bank
joined Option One as a party, claiming their mortgage had priority
57
over the lien held by Option One.
Both Business Bank and Option One moved for summary
58
judgment. “Option One argued that the mortgage in favor of
Business Bank [was] invalid because it [did] not state the amount
that the mortgage secures,” pursuant to section 287.03 of the
59
Minnesota Statutes.
The district court, following the case law, granted Business
60
Bank’s motion for summary judgment.
The “court concluded
that Business Bank’s mortgage had priority over Option One’s
mortgage [and] ordered foreclosure of Business Bank’s
61
mortgage.”
B. The Court of Appeals Decision
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed in part the district
court’s grant of summary judgment, concluding that Business
Bank’s mortgage did not comply with section 287.03 and was thus
62
invalid.
The statute provides: “No instrument, other than a
decree of marriage dissolution or an instrument made pursuant to
it, relating to real estate shall be valid as security for any debt,
unless the fact that it is intended and the initial known amount of
was corporate and therefore did not have to be disclosed to Option One when he
applied for refinancing. The court said Hanson did not need to disclose his
liabilities to Option One because Business Bank orally agreed to release him from
all personal obligations while he refinanced his home. Id. at 287 n.3.
54. Id. at 287.
55. Id.
56. Id. Hanson also sued Business Bank and Carter, and the district court
consolidated the claims with Business Bank’s action. Id. at 287 n.4.
57. Id. at 287.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 288.
62. See Bus. Bank v. Hanson, No. A07-1832, 2008 Minn. Ct. App. LEXIS 1282,
at *2 (Oct. 28, 2008).
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63

the debt are expressed in it.”
The court reasoned that the
meaning of the statute was plain, and it required the instrument to
64
state the amount of the entire debt. Because the mortgage listed
that it secured up to $200,000 and not the entire amount of
approximately $512,000 owed to Business Bank, the court ruled
that the mortgage did not express “the initial known amount of
65
debt” as required by section 287.03.
Business Bank cited both Engenmoen and Staples in support of
the proposition that a mortgage should not be invalidated because
66
of noncompliance with the statute.
The court rejected this
argument, reasoning that although the cases were germane
because they concern a statute which was the predecessor to
section 287.03, they were inapplicable because of the facts and
67
procedural posture of the Business Bank case.
“In Staples,” the court of appeals reasoned, “the security
instrument was facially deficient, but the creditor asked the district
68
court to reform [the instrument] so as to cure the deficiency.”
The district court granted the relief and the supreme court
affirmed, on grounds that there was “no intent to evade the tax and
69
no other improper intent.”
The court of appeals ruled that
because “Business Bank did not plead reformation or otherwise
undertake to reform a concededly invalid mortgage. . . . Staples is
70
inapplicable.”
The court of appeals explained that Engenmoen
stand[s] for the proposition that a mortgage that does not
comply with section 287.03 is invalid unless the
noncompliance has been cured, such as by filing a proper
mortgage . . . or by a district court judgment reforming
the mortgage, in which event the mortgage would have
71
priority as though it were proper when filed.

63. Id. at *20–21 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 287.03 (2006)).
64. Id. at *22 (“An instrument securing debt by granting a mortgage to real
property must state the amount of the entire debt.”).
65. Id. at *23 (“[T]he express language of section 287.03 plainly states that a
mortgage is invalid if it does not state the total amount of debt.”).
66. See id.
67. Id. at *24.
68. Id. (citing Staples v. E. St. Paul State Bank, 122 Minn. 419, 420–21, 142
N.W. 721, 721 (1913)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at *25.
71. Id. at *26.
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The court elaborated that “even in the absence of cure, a
noncompliant mortgage is valid against a third party seeking to
invalidate the mortgage if the third party had actual notice of all
72
facts to which the third party is entitled by the statute.”
Because Hanson did not disclose all details relating to his
obligations to Business Bank, the court determined that Option
One was not in possession of all the facts to which they were
73
Option One was deemed not to have
entitled by the statute.
acquired actual notice, making the mortgage invalid because its
74
noncompliance with section 287.03 was not cured.
Hanson
construed his obligations to Business Bank as “a corporate liability”
75
and, thus, “did not inform Option One of the prior mortgage.” At
best, the court of appeals reasoned, “Option One was aware that
76
Because
Hanson had granted a mortgage to Business Bank.”
Option One was not aware of all the facts to which they were
entitled by section 287.03, Business Bank’s noncompliance was not
77
cured. Accordingly, “the court of appeals held that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Business
78
Bank and against Option One.”
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted Business Bank’s
petition for review, and ruled that Business Bank’s mortgage
complied with the Mortgage Registry Tax statute, upholding the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Business
79
Bank on the issue of mortgage priority.
The court noted that Chapter 287 must be read to give effect
80
to all provisions, and that section 287.05, subdivision 1a(a),
governing mortgages which secure only a portion of a debt recited
72. Id. at *27.
73. See id. (“The district court stated that Option One had ‘constructive
notice of prior interest in the property,’ but that statement appears to mean only
that Option One was aware that Hanson had granted a mortgage to Business
Bank. The relevant inquiry, however, is whether Option One knew the ‘initial
known amount’ of the whole of Hanson’s debt to Business Bank because that is
the information to which Option One is entitled by section 287.03.”).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at *28.
79. Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. 2009).
80. MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2) (2008).
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in the mortgage, was dispositive of the question of the validity of
81
Business Bank’s mortgage. Under that provision, a mortgage may
state on its first page that “[n]otwithstanding anything to the
contrary herein, enforcement of this mortgage is limited to a debt
82
amount of $____ under chapter 287 of Minnesota Statutes.”
When a mortgage contains such a statement, the statute provides
that “the effect of the mortgage . . . as notice for any purpose in this
83
state, shall be limited to the amount contained in the statement.”
Business Bank’s mortgage recited the exact statement
permitted by section 287.05, subdivision 1a(a): “Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary herein, the maximum principal amount of
84
the indebtedness secured by this mortgage is $200,000.”
The
mortgage also disclosed that it was intended to secure only a
portion of the debt Hanson owed Business Bank and that the effect
85
of the mortgage was limited to no more than $200,000.
The court rejected Option One’s contention that Business
Bank’s mortgage secured all $511,925 of Hanson’s debt because
the mortgage provided that it would remain in effect until all of
86
Hanson’s debts were satisfied. In doing so, the court noted that
prior Minnesota decisions permitted that the amount owed on a
87
note may differ from the amount secured by a mortgage.
Although the lien on the property would continue to exist until the
entire debt was satisfied, the most Business Bank could recover in a
88
foreclosure sale would be $200,000.

81. Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 289.
82. MINN. STAT. § 287.05, subdiv. 1a(a) (2008).
83. Id.
84. Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 289. The supreme court also stated that “[t]he
court of appeals reached its conclusion that the mortgage did not set forth the
amount of debt without discussing this language from the first page of the
mortgage.” Id. at 289 n.6.
85. Id. at 289.
86. Id. at 289–90.
87. See Winne v. Lahart, 155 Minn. 307, 309–10, 193 N.W. 587, 588, 588–89
(1923) (stating “the note and the mortgage are separate and distinct
instruments”); Kingsley v. Anderson, 103 Minn. 510, 511, 115 N.W. 642, 643
(1908) (“[A] mortgage securing a note stated to be for a definite sum, when in
fact the note is for a larger sum, is security only for the smaller sum stated in the
mortgage.”).
88. See Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 289 (“[T]hat Hanson owes Business Bank
more than $200,000, and that the bank may be able to hold the mortgage until the
last dollar of those debts is paid, does not mean that more than $200,000 of
Hanson’s debt is secured by the mortgage. Nor does it mean that Business Bank
could collect more than $200,000 by foreclosing its mortgage.”).
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The court also rejected Option One’s position that the
mortgage provisions create ambiguity in the amount of debt
89
secured by the mortgage. The clear statement on the first page of
the mortgage explicitly stated that the maximum amount that the
90
mortgage secured was $200,000.
The court upheld the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Business Bank on the issue of priority between the
91
Business Bank mortgage and the Option One mortgage.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BUSINESS BANK DECISION
The Business Bank court’s decision interpreted the Mortgage
Registry Tax statute as well as other relevant Minnesota law to reach
the proper result. Its decision was consistent with the court’s
history of giving great weight to the legislative purpose of the
Mortgage Registry Tax statute, which was simply to generate
92
revenue and not render otherwise valid contracts invalid. The
93
Mortgage Registry Tax statute is “purely a revenue measure,” and
its only purpose is to ensure that the State of Minnesota collects the
94
proper amount of mortgage registry tax. This is consistent with
the general notion that cases where a junior mortgage lienholder is
95
elevated above senior lienholder are quite rare.

89. Id. at 290.
90. Id. The first page stated that “the maximum principal amount of the
indebtedness secured by this mortgage is $200,000.” Id. Option One’s
interpretation would require that provision to be ignored. Id. The court noted
that the mortgage must be read to give effect to all of its provisions. Id. (citing
Metro Airports Comm’n v. Noble, 763 N.W.2d 639, 645 (Minn. 2009)). In giving
effect to all provisions of the mortgage, the court determined that the plain and
unambiguous contract language provided that the maximum amount of debt
secured by the mortgage was limited to no more than $200,000. Id.
91. Id.
92. See First State Bank of Boyd v. Hayden, 121 Minn. 45, 50, 140 N.W. 132,
134 (1913); Staples v. E. St. Paul State Bank, 122 Minn. 419, 422, 142 N.W. 721,
722 (1913); supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
93. Hayden, 121 Minn. at 50, 140 N.W. at 134.
94. See Brief for Minn. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 36, at 10.
95. 4C PATRICK J. ROHAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 3H.01 (2007) (“Cases in
which a junior mortgage lien is elevated above the paramount mortgage are the
exception and not the rule.”); see also Granse & Assoc. v. Kimm, 529 N.W.2d 6, 9
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (stating the general rule of mortgage priority as “first in
time is first in right.”).
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A. Decision Promotes Stability and Prevents Unnecessary Litigation
Real Property Law Section members of the Minnesota State
Bar Association were undoubtedly relieved by the court’s decision.
According to the Amicus Curiae brief they submitted with the
supreme court requesting a reversal of the court of appeals
decision, a ruling to the contrary would have created wide-ranging
96
consequences. An affirmance would have invalidated mortgages
97
throughout the state and led to inestimable reformation actions.
Countless mortgages have been prepared and recorded in
Minnesota based upon the understanding that the Mortgage
Registry Tax statute does not affect the validity or enforceability of
98
a mortgage so long as the proper tax has been paid. It has long
been common for real estate lawyers and lenders to do exactly as
Business Bank did, stating on the face of a mortgage only the dollar
amount secured by the mortgage lien and not the total amount of
99
the indebtedness.
An affirmance by the court would have
subordinated or rendered unenforceable numerous otherwise valid
100
Lenders holding such mortgages would have been
mortgages.
forced to pursue immediate reformation actions for fear of
101
invalidation by third parties.
Junior lienholders could have
received a windfall, even if they granted their liens with knowledge
102
of other encumbrances.
By ruling in favor of Business Bank, the supreme court
ensured stability in the validity of mortgages and prevented
numerous costly and time-consuming reformation actions.
B. Option One’s Lack of Due Diligence
Although not explicitly addressed by the Business Bank court,
the decision rendered in post-subprime-crisis 2009 reflects the
general proposition that pre-bust lenders were irresponsible and

96. Brief for Minn. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 36, at 10–11.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 11. “By doing so, and then filing the mortgage, a mortgagee is able
to compute the appropriate mortgage registry tax and provide notice to
subsequent lienholders of the amount of indebtedness secured by the property.”
Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 12.
102. Id.
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often outright reckless in their lending practices.
Had Option
One adhered to sound lending practices, it likely would not have
granted Hanson a mortgage in the first place.
A mortgage lender reviewing a potential borrower’s
application has two primary concerns: the status of the borrower
104
and the status of the property. Important factors in determining
the risk of lending to a potential borrower include the borrower’s
employment history, his stability and progress in his job, and his
105
credit history.
An investigation by Option One would have revealed that at
the time the mortgage was executed, Hanson was a part-owner of
an unprofitable pet store which he acquired exclusively on
106
borrowed money.
It would have also revealed that he was
struggling to make payments on notes which he personally
107
guaranteed.
An evaluation conducted in a risk-averse and
prudent manner would have cast much doubt upon the
presumption that Hanson was capable of repaying such an
108
enormous loan.
Option One’s suspicions would have further mounted
following a proper investigation of the status of the property.
Although even a good title searcher can miss liens, it is assumed
that a proper title search would have uncovered two existing liens,
109
As the third mortgagor on Hanson’s
totaling $1.08 million.
103. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S HOUSING 16 (2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu
/publications/markets/son2007/son2007.pdf; Nick Timiraos, Hot Topic: The
Subprime Market’s Rough Road, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2007, at A7, available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB117167930652011972-pdK4yo0w_
TroFF5iEzgdlO0rug0_20070223.html?mod=blogs.
104. See D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF FEDERAL MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS 105
(1989); LEONARD P. VIDGER, BORROWING AND LENDING ON RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY
99–107 (1981).
105. See BURKE, supra note 104, at 105; VIDGER, supra note 104, at 99–105.
106. See Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 286 (Minn. 2009) (“NAPD
purchased U.S. Pet solely from the loan proceeds.”).
107. Id.
108. Nothing in the record indicates that Hanson had an additional source of
income independent from his NAPD venture. Assuming that is the case, his
meager income derived from NAPD would likely be insufficient to make monthly
payments on a combined $1.08 million debt owed to Chase Bank and Business
Bank even before the third mortgage was executed. The fact that Hanson
consistently struggled to make payments and continually was forced to renegotiate
his existing debts with Business Bank is strong evidence that he was in no shape to
be undertaking additional obligations. Id.
109. There was a $200,000 lien in favor of Business Bank, and an $880,000 lien
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property, Option One would have known that two other companies
110
Again, a risk-averse
would have priority over their mortgage.
lender would be very hesitant to lend on this property, as the first
two liens would need to be satisfied before the third mortgagor
111
could recover at a foreclosure sale.
The fact that Hanson did not properly disclose his liabilities to
112
Option One is of little consequence. Option One is deemed to
113
have acquired constructive notice of the Business Bank mortgage,
as it was properly recorded fourteen months before Option One
114
recorded its mortgage. Constructive notice is equivalent to actual
notice of what appears on the face of the record to the party bound
to search the record, whether or not the party actually has
115
conducted a search.
One who examines the records is
116
But, only a
chargeable with actual notice of all they contain.
in favor of Chase Bank. Id. at 287. Business Bank’s failure to record the
amendment to its mortgage until two weeks after Option One recorded is
irrelevant. Id. As the court notes, the amount of debt that was secured by the
mortgage cannot exceed $200,000. Id. at 290. The original mortgage was
executed in the amount of $200,000 and was properly recorded about a year prior
to Option One’s involvement with the property. Id. at 287. When Hanson sought
to refinance his home in 2005, a title search would have revealed that Business
Bank held a $200,000 second mortgage on Hanson’s home. Id. While a prompt
recording of Business Bank’s modification would have nominally changed the
amount of debt secured by the lien, the effect for purposes of notice was
essentially identical. The mortgage would still have secured only $200,000. That
Option One did not discover Business Bank’s interest at all suggests a prompt
recording of the amendment would have made no difference whatsoever. See id.
110. See Host v. Host, 497 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (“Generally,
the rule applied to determine the priority of liens is ‘first in time is first in right.’”
(quoting Gould v. City of St. Paul, 120 Minn. 172, 176, 139 N.W. 293, 294 (1913)).
111. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.4 (1997) (“When the
foreclosure sale price exceeds the amount of the mortgage obligation, the surplus
is applied to liens and other interests terminated by the foreclosure in order of
their priority . . . .”); 6 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW § 51.02(2)(b) (Theodore Eisenberg
ed., Matthew Bender 2010) (“A junior mortgage is generally a second or third
mortgage given on the same property. It is legally subordinate to prior mortgages,
and known to be such upon its making.”). See generally DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS (2004) (helping lawyers advise clients
on mortgages, liens, and other real estate issues).
112. Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 287 n.3.
113. See infra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
114. See Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 287.
115. See Bailey v. Galpin, 40 Minn. 319, 323, 41 N.W. 1054, 1055 (1889); 1
JAMES D. OLSON, MINNESOTA RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE, § 6.08 (Matthew Bender
2010).
116. See Normania Twp. v. Yellow Medicine Cnty., 205 Minn. 451, 458, 286
N.W. 881, 885 (1939); Cable v. Minneapolis Stock Yards & Packing Co., 47 Minn.
417, 422, 50 N.W. 528, 530 (1891); OLSON, supra note 115.
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record that is sufficiently full and explicit to give the requisite
117
information can act as constructive notice.
Nothing in the record indicates that the recording of Business
118
Bank’s mortgage was improper, inadequate, or incomplete.
Although searching title is an inexact science, had Option One
conducted a proper title search, it likely would have acquired
actual knowledge of Business Bank’s mortgage. The information
was readily available, and would have been uncovered with
adequate due diligence. Therefore, Option One was charged with
constructive notice of the Business Bank mortgage, rendering
Hanson’s failure to disclose his obligation immaterial.
Absent special circumstances, lenders and borrowers deal at
119
arm’s length and thorough assessments must be made, especially
when the amount of the prospective mortgage is large. It follows
that financial institutions and banks should be expected to do their
homework. Courts should not be expected to step in and grant
careless companies relief, especially based upon statutory
120
provisions that were drafted to generate revenue.
By forcing
Option One to bear the consequences of improperly investigating
Hanson’s application and the title to his home, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reinforces the proposition that companies who
negligently or carelessly assess applicants do so at their own peril.
C. Option One as a Key Player in the Subprime Crisis
“Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of
lending institutions to protect shareholders’ equity, myself
included, are in a state of shocked disbelief.”—Alan
121
Greenspan, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve.

117.
118.
119.

See Roberts v. Grace, 16 Minn. 126, 134–36 (1870); OLSON, supra note 115.
See Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 287.
See GERALD L. BLANCHARD, 1 LENDER LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE &
PREVENTION, § 5:03 (2000).
120. See Engenmoen v. Lutroe, 153 Minn. 409, 412, 190 N.W. 894, 895–96
(1922) (“The act is a revenue measure purely, and the only purpose of its
prohibitive provisions is to compel the payment of the prescribed tax. A
mortgage, whatever its form, is not rendered void by failure to comply with the
requirements of the statute . . . .”).
121. Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business
/economy/24panel.html.
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Perhaps there is a reason why Option One conducted such a
poor assessment of Hanson’s ability to repay the mortgage: because
it simply did not care. Option One engaged in a practice known as
122
“originate-and-distribute,” where mortgage originators sold off
123
Because the
their mortgages as soon as they were made.
mortgage lenders made money on the volume of loans originated
and did not have to live with the credit consequences of the loans,
124
their underwriting standards declined. The Minnesota Supreme
Court may have considered this unsettling business model when
125
ruling against Option One.
Mortgage originators such as Option One played a critical role
in the recent crisis which nearly collapsed credit markets and
126
deteriorated economic conditions.
These originators granted
127
mortgages to “subprime” borrowers. The term “subprime” refers
128
to the credit characteristics of individual borrowers.
Subprime
borrowers typically have weakened credit histories that include
payment delinquencies, and possibly more severe problems such as
129
charge-offs, judgments, and bankruptcies. They may also display
reduced repayment capacity as measured by credit scores, debt-toincome ratios, or other criteria that may encompass borrowers with
130
incomplete credit histories.
The mortgages granted to subprime borrowers allowed
borrowers to finance and refinance their homes based on capital
gains due to housing price appreciation and turn it into collateral
122. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 387 (2008).
123. See id.
124. Id.; see also Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1319; Vikas Bajaj, A Cross-Country
Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2007, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2007/05/08/business/worldbusiness/08iht-subprime.4.5623442.html.
125. This is not to suggest that Business Bank’s model was entirely flawless.
Perhaps it should not have granted Hanson a loan in the first place. One might
also argue that it should not have continually afforded him so many opportunities
to get his business off the ground.
126. See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis
of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 549 (2009), for a discussion of other factors that had a
role in the crisis, such as cheap credit, credit default swaps, and deregulation of
financial markets, which are not discussed here.
127. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at Morehouse
College: Four Questions about the Financial Crisis (Apr. 14, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090414a.htm.
128. Press Release, FDIC, Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending
Programs (Jan. 31, 2001), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2001/pr0901a.html.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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131

for a new mortgage. Borrowers also extracted this new equity for
132
Essentially, an increase in the value of a home
consumption.
allowed owners to borrow additional funds regardless of whether
133
existing debt had been paid down.
Because the originators had “little or no regard for whether
the loans would be repaid[,]” they did whatever was necessary to
134
have deals approved.
“‘[N]o-doc’ loans, i.e., mortgages made
without requiring any written verification of borrower income or
assets,” accounted for forty-six percent of the subprime mortgage
135
market in 2006.
Lenders unnecessarily pushed even well136
Particularly in
qualified borrowers into subprime mortgages.
2005 and 2006 (Option One granted Hanson a mortgage in
137
October 2005), “an environment [prevailed] where originators . .
. misrepresented loan terms to borrowers, and borrowers [and]
originators increasingly lied about borrowers’ income, property
138
value, and other qualifications.”
The objective was not to grant
mortgages to those who could repay them, but rather to grant as
139
many mortgages as possible.
Frederic Mishkin, an economist at Columbia Business School
and a former member of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, explained the effect of such a system:
The originate-to-distribute model, unfortunately, created
some severe incentive problems, which are referred to as
principal-agent problems, or more simply as agency
problems, in which the agent (the originator of the loans)
did not have the incentives to act fully in the interest of
the principal (the ultimate holder of the loan).
Originators had every incentive to maintain origination
volume, because that would allow them to earn substantial
fees, but they had weak incentives to maintain loan
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Alan M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV.
617, 634 (2008).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 632 (“[S]ubprime mortgages have also resulted in billions of excess
interest being paid by homeowners who could have qualified for prime rate
mortgages.”).
137. Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn. 2009).
138. White, supra note 134, at 634.
139. See id. (“The ‘sell to distribute’ model created incentives for originators to
deliver loan volume with little or no regard for whether loans would be repaid or
foreclosed.”).
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140

quality.
The investment institutions that purchased these loans would
package them together with slivers of other mortgages and sell
141
them as a safe investment, a process known as securitization.
These securities were customarily called mortgage-backed securities
or collateralized debt obligations, and were sold off to outside
142
investors.
These securities were “backed by[,] and thus their
payment derived principally or entirely from[,] a mixed pool of
143
mortgage loans.”
Investors bought the securities as “relatively
safe (‘investment grade’) long-term investments that paid higher
144
rates of return than similarly rated bonds.”
However, the
institutions that assembled and sold these securities faced the same
incentive and moral hazard problems as the originators of the
145
146
mortgages. Volume, not quality, was the main focus.

140. Frederic Mishkin, Speech at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum (Feb. 29,
2008); see also Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14358, 2008), available at www.nber.org/papers/w14358
(“[O]riginators and underwriters of loans no longer have an incentive to pay
attention to the risk of the loans they originate, since they are not residual
claimants on these loans. . . . All major bank regulators and central bankers appear
to subscribe to this view . . . .”).
141. See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 122, at 376. This is
not to suggest that securitization does not serve a useful purpose in the world of
finance. “Securitization efficiently allocates risk with capital[,] . . . enables
companies to access capital markets directly . . . at low[] cost . . . , and . . . avoids
middleman inefficiencies.” See Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, supra note 2,
at 1315; see also Alan S. Blinder, Six Fingers of Blame in the Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2007, § 3, at 4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/30
/business/30view.html (“Securitization is a marvelous thing. It has lubricated the
market and made mortgages more affordable. We certainly don’t want it to
end.”).
142. See Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 376.
143. Id.
144. Houman B. Shadab, Guilty By Association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps, 4
ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 407, 413 (2010) (citing JANET M. TAVAKOLI, STRUCTURED
FINANCE & COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CASH AND
SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION 331–54, 405–27 (2d ed. 2008)).
145. John Kiff & Paul Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent
Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets 8 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. WP/07/188, 2007) (“Safeguards ensuring prudent lending were
weakened by the combination of fee-driven remuneration at each stage of the
securitization process and the dispersion of credit risk which weakened
monitoring incentives. Hence, intermediaries were remunerated primarily by
generating loan volume rather than quality, even as the credit spreads on the
resulting securities shrank.”).
146. Id.
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The securitization process was profitable and demand for the
147
At their peak, subprime mortgages were
securities increased.
148
being securitized at the rate of $100 billion per quarter.
However, “the transactions were so complex that many investors
149
“The prospectus itself in a typical
could not understand them.”
[collateralized debt obligation security] can be hundreds of pages
150
long.” “Investors placed too much faith in ratings agencies” who
failed to properly disclose the risks associated with these
151
securities.
U.S. regulators also failed to protect investors and
152
consumers. In buying and selling securities which they could not
properly value, investors exposed themselves to a large amount of
153
uncertainty and risk.
Ultimately, the system unraveled when home values declined
and “investors took large losses as mortgage-related assets were
154
marked down in anticipation of high defaults.”
“By the third
quarter of 2007, 24% of all subprime loans . . . were either

147. Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Crisis 31–
32 (Dec. 5, 2008) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020396.
Accordingly, the subprime share of the mortgage market increased sharply (from
around 8% in 2001 to 20% in 2006) along with the securitized share of the
subprime mortgage market (from 54% in 2001 to 75% in 2006). Id.
148. White, supra note 134, at 618.
149. Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 383; see also Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng,
Credit & Blame: How Rating Firms’ Calls Fueled Subprime Mess, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15,
2007, at A10, available at http://www.homepage.villanova.edu/shawn.howton/Fin
%202227/articles/subprimemess.pdf (quoting Edward Grebeck, chief executive of
a debt-strategy firm called Tempus Advisors, who stated, “A lot of institutional
investors bought [mortgage-backed] securities substantially based on their ratings
[without fully understanding what they bought], in part because the market has
become so complex.”).
150. Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 383.
151. Blinder, supra note 141, at 4. Some suggest that rating agencies had
incentive problems of their own. “Under the current system, they are hired and
paid by the issuers of the very security they rate . . . .” Id. But see Schwarcz, supra
note 122, at 401 (“[T]he reputational cost of a bad rating usually far exceeds the
income received by giving the rating.”).
152. See White, supra note 134, at 618 (U.S. regulators failed to protect either
investors or consumers in the fragmentation of mortgage underwriting,
origination, servicing and investment as a result of securitization).
153. See Donald R. van Deventer, Fair-Value Accounting, CDOs and the Credit
Crisis of 2007–2008: Complexity and Model Risk in the Collateralized Debt Obligation
Market Are Severe, BANK ACCOUNTING & FINANCE 3, 4 (2008) (“One of the most
important rules of financial markets is that ‘if you can’t value a security, don’t buy
it and don’t sell it, because you will be taken advantage of if you do.’ This critical
but often ignored maxim will be ignored no longer . . . .”).
154. See Mishkin, supra note 140.
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155

delinquent or in foreclosure.” “Investors realized that they were
sadly mistaken regarding their assumption that [mortgage-backed
156
securities] with high credit ratings embodied very little risk.”
Families lost their homes, municipal tax bases were depleted, and
157
158
crime rose. Even renters were indirectly affected by the crisis.
Option One was a major player in the subprime market, and
159
thus, the subprime crisis. Based on market share as of March 31,
160
2007 (just as problems in the subprime market began to show),
Option One was the fourth largest originator of subprime
161
mortgages in the entire country.
According to the annual report of H&R Block, which owned
Option One during both the Business Bank dispute and the
subprime crisis, Option One’s primary business was the origination
162
and securitization of subprime mortgages.
In fiscal years 2005
through 2007, Option One originated $98.9 billion in subprime
163
mortgage loans.
Its typical borrowers were those with limited
income documentation, high levels of consumer debt, or past
164
credit problems. In 2005, the year Hanson’s mortgage to Option
One was executed, 38.1% of its borrowers simply stated their
165
Option One
income and provided no documentation.
securitized the mortgages it wrote, selling substantially all of its
155. White, supra note 134, at 618 (citation omitted).
156. Mishkin, supra note 140.
157. White, supra note 134, at 631–32. “Studies . . . have tabulated the
devastating cost to entire neighborhoods and cities of the subprime foreclosure
tidal wave. In addition to the loss in property values to neighborhoods, subprime
foreclosures are taxing municipal resources, undermining the property tax base,
burdening already-burdened social service providers, and increasing crime.” Id.
158. Vicki Been & Allegra Glashausser, Tenants: Innocent Victims of the Nation’s
Foreclosure Crisis, 2 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“Renters are innocent victims
of the foreclosure crisis, losing their homes through no fault of their own when
their landlord goes into foreclosure.”).
159. See generally Navid Vazire, Flawed Institutions and Markets: From the Savings
& Loan Debacle Forward: Smoke and Mirrors: Predatory Lending and the Subprime
Mortgage Loan Securitization Pyramid Scheme, 30 PACE L. REV. 41, 41–45 (2009)
(explaining the role of subprime mortgage originators in the subprime financial
crisis).
160. New Century Financial, the country’s largest subprime lender, filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy only two days later. See New Century Files for Chapter 11
bankruptcy, CNNMONEY.COM, Apr. 3, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/04/02
/news/companies/new_century_bankruptcy.
161. H&R Block Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10 (June 29, 2007).
162. Id. at 8.
163. Id. at 9.
164. Id. at 8.
165. Id. at 9.
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166

subprime mortgages on a daily basis.
Predictably, Option One came crashing down during the crisis
it helped create. In fiscal year 2007, Option One generated a pre167
tax loss in excess of $1.2 billion.
In early 2008, it was estimated
168
Option One was
that it had accrued over $700 million in debt.
eventually acquired by WL Ross, Inc., a company specializing in
169
improving the financial situation of distressed businesses.
Option One granted Hanson his mortgage in the fall of
170
171
2005, a time when home prices peaked around the country.
Based on its business model, it is unlikely that Option One cared
about Hanson’s ability to repay the mortgage. Hanson could easily
have been classified as a subprime borrower since the business he
operated was losing money and his debt-to-income ratios were
172
However, this was likely of little to no
presumably very high.
significance to Option One, as it was only concerned with getting
the mortgage on the books and immediately selling it to investors.
Option One embodied the exact type of business which has
received so much blame after the instigators of the crisis were
173
revealed. Screening and monitoring borrowers is a costly process,
so Option One decided to cut corners. It did shoddy research
before granting an enormous mortgage and had little regard for
the credit consequences of the loan. By rejecting Option One’s
attempt to invalidate a prior mortgage, the supreme court forced it
to live with such consequences.

166. Id. at 10. However, the practice of selling a mortgage on the secondary
market the very day of closing is not uncommon and has existed for decades. See
Sandra R. Bullington, The Role of the Secondary Mortgage Market, in 4B REAL ESTATE
FINANCING § 2L.01 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 2008).
167. H&R Block Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 29 (June 29, 2007).
168. Glenn Setzer, Big Losses for PMI Company and HR Block Unloads Option One,
MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY, Mar. 17, 2008, available at http://www.mortgagenewsdaily
.com/3172008_Option_One.asp.
169. HOOVER’S COMPANY RECORDS, WL ROSS & CO. LLC (2010),
http://www.hoovers.com/company/WL_Ross__Co_LLC/rctkjif-1.html.
170. Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn. 2009).
171. Rick Brooks & Constance Mitchell Ford, The United States of Subprime,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2007, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article
/SB119205925519455321.html.
172. See Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 287.
173. Antje Berndt & Anurag Gupta, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the
Originate-to-Distribute Model of Bank Credit 2 (Working Paper, Oct. 24, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290312.
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D. Freedom to Contract Ultimately Prevails
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision upheld the greater
interest of freedom to contract. Freedom to contract for lawful
purposes with whomever a party pleases remains one of the most
174
fundamental interests of the judicial system. People should have
the freedom “to make arrangements that suit their individual
175
interests.”
Efficiency theorists worry a great deal about
176
This public policy has been
limitations on freedom to contract.
cited as a dominant factor when weighing the enforceability of
177
certain contractual provisions.
Hanson entered into an agreement with Business Bank, and
178
the contractual terms of their agreement ultimately prevailed.
Hanson was provided with numerous opportunities to get his
179
business off the ground, and Business Bank was able to secure a
180
In
portion of Hanson’s substantial debt to a tangible asset.
consideration for additional fees, Hanson was afforded additional
181
time and money to make his business profitable.
Both parties
eventually received what they desired.
Option One did not contract with Hanson until over a year
182
later, and, accordingly, Business Bank had seniority in lien
183
priority.
174. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 5 (5th ed.
2003) (“[T]he parties’ power to contract as they please for lawful purposes
remains a basic principle of our legal system.”).
175. Joseph William Singer, Essay, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and
Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1028 (2009).
176. Id. at 1034.
177. See Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 308 Minn. 134, 136–37, 241 N.W.2d 91, 92
(1976) (remanding to determine whether the public policy of freedom to contract
regarding the presence of an exculpatory clause in a lease was outweighed by
public policy of the landlord assuming certain duties); see also Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
877 v. Loberg Plumbing & Heating Co., 266 Minn. 426, 434, 123 N.W.2d 793, 799
(1963) (holding courts must enforce declared purpose of contract, if within lawful
scope of contractual objectives); James Quirk Milling Co. v. Minneapolis & St.
Louis R.R. Co., 98 Minn. 22, 23, 107 N.W. 742, 742 (1906) (proclaiming it public
policy that freedom to contract remain inviolate except only in cases which
contravene some principle which is of even more importance).
178. Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. 2009).
179. Id. at 286–87.
180. Id. at 287.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Timeline, LLC v. Williams Holdings No. 3, LLC, 698 N.W.2d 181, 185
n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (“Seniority is usually determined by the chronological
order in which liens or mortgages are recorded.”).
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The decision is consistent with a principle articulated by the
court over seventy years ago: “[c]ourts should not, nor do they,
look for excuses or loopholes to avoid contracts fairly and
deliberately made whether such be by individuals or
184
corporations.” The freedom to contract is protected by both the
185
state and federal constitutions and in refusing to invalidate a fair
186
and deliberate contract, the court protected that right.
The supreme court’s ruling also protected the reasonable
expectations of the parties who entered into a bargain. In doing
so, the court moved to promote and facilitate business
187
Such agreements assist the division of labor, goods
agreements.
find their way to the places where they are most needed, and
188
economic activity is generally stimulated.
Parties who sign
documents must be held liable, otherwise, such documents “would
be entirely worthless and chaos would prevail in our business
189
relations.”
If a business person knew that obstacles could
potentially stand in the way of judicial relief, she would be hesitant
to rely on a promise where the legal sanction was of significance to

184. Equitable Holding Co. v. Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 202 Minn. 529,
535, 279 N.W. 736, 740 (1938).
185. Fed. Distillers, Inc. v. State, 304 Minn. 28, 45, 229 N.W.2d 144, 157 (1975)
(“The freedom to contract with respect to one’s property and in the conduct of a
lawful business to select the party with whom one chooses to do so is a part of the
liberty protected by the due process clauses of the State and Federal
Constitutions.”).
186. This is not to suggest that this principle is without limits. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. d (1997) (“[I]t may, in rare
instances, be desirable to protect residential and small business loan mortgagors,
whether in default or not, from inequitable attempts by mortgagees to profit by
acquiring appreciated and improved real estate by means of option exercise. Such
mortgagors are apt to be unrepresented by counsel and to be less sophisticated
negotiators than their large business counterparts. Consequently, close judicial
scrutiny in such situations may be justified. . . . It is preferable for courts to deal
with such situations by use of their inherent discretion to deny equitable relief
under harsh and inequitable circumstances.”)
187. See, e.g., Starlite Ltd. P’ship v. Landry’s Rest., Inc., 780 N.W.2d 396, 398
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (“Enforcement of a contract’s legal obligations in a way that
is consistent with the parties’ stated expectations provides certainty and
predictability in contractual relationships.”); see also 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) (discussing
purpose of contract law).
188. Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61 (1936).
189. Currie State Bank v. Schmitz, 628 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)
(quoting Watkins Prod., Inc. v. Butterfield, 274 Minn. 378, 380, 144 N.W. 56, 58
(1966)).
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190

her.
The decision rendered by the court helps to ease such
hesitance in the minds of business people.
E. Legislature Amends Statute to Reflect Decision
Less than a year after the supreme court ruling, the Minnesota
191
These amendments,
Legislature amended section 287.03.
192
effective July 1, 2010, essentially codify the Business Bank decision.
They also attempt to reduce the detrimental impact of the court of
appeals’ ruling, which would have invalidated mortgages with very
broad debt descriptions entirely.
The language “shall be valid” was replaced by “may be
193
enforced.”
The legislature also deleted “the initial known
194
amount of the debt.” Presumably, this amendment will no longer
permit parties like Option One to argue that a mortgage should be
completely invalidated because of minor non-compliance with the
Mortgage Registry Tax statute. The deletion of the harsh language,
195
which led the court of appeals to rule in favor of Option One,
should lead to results more consistent with the legislative intent of
196
the statute. This is also in harmony with the Minnesota State Bar

190. See Fuller, supra note 188, at 62.
191. H.F. 2828, 2009-2010 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2010). The statue now
reads as follows:
No instrument, other than a decree of marriage dissolution or an
instrument made pursuant to it, relating to real estate may be enforced as
security for any debt, unless the fact that it is so intended is expressed in
it. Except as provided in section 287.05, an instrument may not be
enforced as security for a debt amount in excess of: (1) the initial known
amount of the debt expressed in the instrument if the instrument secures
that entire debt amount; or (2) the portion of the initial known amount
of the debt expressed in the instrument if the instrument secures only a
portion of that debt amount.
Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Bus. Bank v. Hanson, No. 27-CV-06-14599, 2008 Minn. Ct. App. LEXIS
1282, at *23 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2008) (“[T]he express language of section
287.03 plainly states that a mortgage is invalid if it does not state the total amount
of debt.”) (emphasis added).
196. See First State Bank of Boyd v. Hayden, 121 Minn. 45, 50, 140 N.W. 132,
134 (1913) (“The statute is purely a revenue measure, and nothing therein to
indicate that it was the legislative intent to declare instruments void for
noncompliance therewith.”); Engenmoen, 153 Minn. at 412, 190 N.W. at 895–96
(“The act is a revenue measure purely, and the only purpose of its prohibitive
provisions is to compel the payment of the prescribed tax.”).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 1

2010]

BUSINESS BANK V. HANSON

323

Association’s contention that the statute should not be used as
197
means to invalidate or subordinate mortgages.
The legislature also added a direct reference to section
198
287.05, which reads:
When the real property identified in a mortgage . . . is
intended to secure only a portion of a debt amount
recited or referred to in the mortgage, the mortgage may
contain the following statement, or its equivalent on the
first page: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
herein, enforcement of this mortgage is limited to a debt
amount of $____ under chapter 287 of Minnesota
199
Statutes.”
The amendment expressly provides that a party is permitted to
do exactly as Business Bank did: a mortgage may secure a larger
debt, but the amount effective as security is limited to that
200
expressed in the instrument. This amendment is consistent with
201
nearly a century’s worth of practice and precedent.
The supreme court, however, was unable to correct all of the
problems created by the court of appeals’ decision because of the
narrow scope of the Business Bank decision. While section 287.05
deals with mortgages with contractual debt limits, the supreme
court did not, and possibly could not, address mortgages with very
broad debt descriptions. Minnesota law after the court of appeals
decision prohibited a legal instrument relating to real estate from
being used as security for a debt unless the instrument specifically
202
stated that it was intended to be used in that way. The statutory
203
amendment was aimed to fix this problem.
By amending the statute to codify the Business Bank decision,
the Minnesota Legislature wholeheartedly endorsed the supreme
court’s ruling and attempted to cure harm created by the court of
appeals decision.

197. Brief for Minn. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 36, at 2–3.
198. H.F. 2828, 2009-2010 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2010).
199. MINN. STAT. § 287.05, subdiv. 1a(a) (2008).
200. H.F. 2828, 2009-2010 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2010).
201. See supra Part II.
202. See MINN. H. REP., B. SUMMARY, H.F. 2828 (2010), available at
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/bs/86/HF2828.html.
203. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
By ruling in favor of Business Bank, the Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld the validity of a mortgage in compliance with the
204
Mortgage Registry Tax statute.
However, the court specifically
declined to address the question of whether a mortgage that does
205
The
not comply with the statute is invalid as a matter of law.
answer to such a question is difficult to predict since strong policies
support a finding either way. The purpose of the statute is to
produce revenue, not invalidate mortgages, but a lax attitude
regarding compliance with the statute may frustrate its true
purpose and result in a downturn in revenue.
The Business Bank decision reinforced the principles made
clear by the subprime mortgage crisis: lenders must exercise due
diligence and grant mortgages only to those capable of repaying
them. As evidenced by this decision, Minnesota courts will have
little sympathy for those who make reckless and regrettable
decisions.

204.
205.

Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 290.
Id. at 290 n.8.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

27

